IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
LUKE W. CAIN -PETITIONER
Vs.
ROBERT BURTON, WARDEN -RESPONDENT(S
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

CALIFORNIA HEALTH CARE FACILITY

STOCKTON, CALIFORNIA 95213

LUKE W. CAIN

FILED
AUG 19 2021

RECEIVED

OCT - 1 2021

OFFICE OF THE CLERK SUPREME COURT, U.S.

QUESTION(S) PRESENTED

GENERALLY, A FEDERAL COURT MAY NOT REVIEW A STATE COURT SENTENCE THAT IS WITH-IN THE STATUTORY LIMITS. IT MAY VACATE A SENTENCE, HOWEVER IF IT WAS IMPOSED IN VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, LAWS, OR TREATIES OF THE UNITED STATES. 4 THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAUSE DOES NO MORE THAN PREVENT THE SENTENCING COURT FROM 5 PRESCRIBING GREATER PUNISHMENT THAN THE LEGISLATURE INTENDED. (SEE MISSOURI V. MUNTER, 459 U.S. 359,368-369.) AN INFORMATION WAS FILED AGAINST THE PETITIONER IN THE STATE COURT, CHARGING HIM WITH FOUR COUNTS OF KIDNAPING FOR ROBBERY, SIX COUNTS OF ROBBERY, AND ONE COUNT OF DISUADING A WITNESS FOR WHICH HE WAS SUB-10 SEQUENTLY FOUND GUILTY OF. THOUGH BOTH THE PROSECUTO AND THE TRIAL COURT CON-11 CEEDED THAT PETITIONER! SENTIRE GOAL WAS TO ROB THE VICTIMS AND WHEN THE MOVE-12 MENT BEGAN, IT WAS TO FURTHER HIS GOAL TO ROB THEM. (IN EXAMPLE, IT WAS ONE INTENT AND OBJECTIVE AND A CONTINUOUS COURSE OF CONDUCT) THE TRIAL COURT NEVERTHELESS 13 IMPOSED SEPERATE PUNISHMENTS FOR COUNTS 5 AND 9 DURING A SINGLE TRIAL. 15 MULTIPLE PUNISHMENTS ARE PERMISSIBLE "WHEN THE LEGISLATIVE INTENT IS CLEAR 17 FROM THE FACE OF THE STATUTE OR THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY." (GARREIT V. UNITED STATES, 471 U.S. AT 799) HERE, PENAL CODE § 669 AUTHORIZEZ MULTIPLE PUNISHMENTS 18 19 FOR MULTIPLE OFFENSES REGARDLESS OF WHETHER THEY ARISE OUT OF THE SAME TRIAL, 20 THE SAME ACT OR COURSE OF CONDUCT OR UNDERLYING CIRCUMSTANCES. PENAL CODES §§ 21 \$54 AND 654 DO NOT AUTHORIZE MULTIPLE PUNISHMENTS FOR MULTIPLE OFFENSES ARISING 22 BUT OF THE SAME TRIAL. THE SAME ACT OR COURSE OF CONDUCT OR UNDERLYING CIRCUM-STANCES. BECAUSE THE LEGISLATURE'S INTENT IS NOT CLEAR FROM THE FACE OF THE 24 PENAL CODES ON WHETHER MULTIPLE PUNISHMENT'S ARE PERMISSIBLE AND BECAUSE THE 25 TRIAL COURT IMPOSED SEPERATE SENTENCES DURING A SINGLE TRIAL FOR ONE CONTIN-DOUS COURSE OF CRIMINAL CONDUCT, THE ONLY QUESTION AS TO THE ISSUE OF MULTIPLE 26 PUNISHMENT THEN IS THE LEGISLATIVE INTENT IN ENACTING THE ABOVE PENAL CODES. THE QUESTIONS PRESENTED ARE: WHAT PUNISHMENT'S ARE CONSTITUTIONALLY

```
PERMISSIBLE ? AND WHETHER PETITIONERS CONSECUTIVE SENTENCE IS CONSTITUTIONALLY
 2
    PERMISSIBLE ?
 3
                                 TABLE OF CONTENTS
 4
 5
    PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI.
 6
    OPINIOS AND ORDERS BELOW.
    DPINIONS AND ORDERS FROM THE CALIFORNIA STATE COURTS.
    JURISDICTION.
 8
    CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS.
 9
10
   STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
    REASONS FOR GRANTING CERTIORARI.
11
    ARGUMENT I.
12
    WHAT PUNISHMENTS THE LEGISLATIVE BRANCH AUTHORIZE AS
13
    CONSTITUTIONALLY PERMISSIBLE FOR MULTIPLE OFFENSES IS
    NOT CLEAR ON IT'S FACE.
14
    ARGUMENT II
15
    BECAUSE THE SENTENCING COURT IMPOSED GREATER PUNISH-
16
    MENT THAN THE LEGISLATURE INTENDED, PETITIONER I'S
17
    BENTENCE MAY NOT BE CONSTITUTIONALL PERMISSIBLE.
    CONCLUSION.
18
    APPENDIX.
19
    ORDER DENYING THE PETITION FOR REVIEW, CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT, MAY 26, 2021.
20
21
    ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS, COURT OF APPEALS, FOURTH
    APPELLATE DISTRICT, DIVISION TWO, MARCH 19, 2021.
22
    ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS, RIVERSIDE SUPERIOR COURT,
23
    NOV. 13, 2020.
24
                                                                             PAGE (S)
                                  TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
    CASE
25
26 -
    ALBERNAZ V. UNITED STATES, 450 U.S. 333,344
                                                                           3
27-
    BROWN V. OHIO, (1977) 432 U.S. 161,165
                                                                           5
28
```

	CASE III	PAGE(S)
1	COLTON V. HALL, 386 FED. APPX. 606,607 (9TH CIR. 2010).	4
2	JONES V. THOMAS, (1989) 429 U.S. 376,381.	5
3	MISSOURI V. HUNTER, (1983), 459 U.S. 359, 66,368,369.	2,5
4	OHIO V. JOHNSON, 476 U.S. 493,499.	5
5	DREGAN V. ICE (2009), 555 U.S. 160, 166	4
6	PEOPLE V. BLACK (2007), 41 CAL. 4TH 799,821,822.	4
7	PEOPLE V. HESTER, (2000), 22 CAL. 4TH 290,294.	4,6
8	PLACENCIA V. ALAMEIDA, 467 F.3D 1190,1204 (9TH CIR. 2006).	5
9	UNITED STATES V. BAKER, 63 F.3D 1478, 1494 (9TH CIR. 1995).	3
10	UNITED STATES V. WHITE, 116 F.3D 903,932.	3
11	WHALEN V. UNITED STATES (1980), 445 U.S. 684,688.	4
12	PENAL CODES	
13	PENAL CODE § 654	4,6
14	PENAL CODE § 669	4
15	PENAL CODE § 954	4
16	STATUTES	
	28 U.S.C § 1257 (a).	1
18	28 U.S.C § 2254 (a).	1
19	SUPREME COURT RULES	
20	RULE 13	1
21	ULE 30.1	1
22		
23		
24		
25		
26		
27		
28		

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

DENIAL OF THE PETITION FOR REVIEW IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA.

ç

OPINIONS AND ORDERS BELOW

OPINIONS AND ORDERS FROM THE CALIFORNIA STATE COURTS

THE MAY 26,2021 ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA DENYING MR. CAIN^NS

PETITION FOR REVIEW IS ATTACHED AT APP.1. THE MARCH 19,2021 ORDER OF THE CALIFORNIA COURT OF APPEALS, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT, DIVISION TWO DENYING MR.

CAINNS PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS IS ATTACHED AT APP.2. THE NOV 13,2020 ORDER OF THE RIVERSIDE SUPERIOR COURT DENYING MR. CAIN'S PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS IS ATTACHED ATTAPP. 3...

JURISDICTION

THIS PETITION ARISES FROM PROCEEDINGS ON AN APPLICATION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS, FILED PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C § 2254. THE SUPREME COURT HAS APPELLATE JURISDICTION TO REVIEW THIS CASE UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (a). THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA FILED OTS ORDER DENYING THE PETITION FOR REVIEW ON MAY 26, 2021, THIS PETITION IS TIMELY PURSUANT TO SUPREME COURT RULES 13 AND 30.1.

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS

THIS CASE INVOLVES THE APPLICATION OF 28 U.S.C. § 2254 WHICH PROVIDES: A FEDERAL COURT MAY ENTERTAIN A PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS "IN BEHALF OF A PERSON IN CUSTODY PURSUANT TO THE JUDGMENT OF A STATE COURT ON THE GROUND. THAT HE IS IN CUSTODY IN VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OR LAWS OR TREATIES OF THE UNITED STATES," 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). THE WRIT.OF HABEAS CORPUS LIES WHEN THE TRIAL.COURT HAS SENTENCED A DEFENDANT TO A TERM IN EXCESS OF THE MAXIMUM PROVIDE BY LAW.... THE WRIT WILL ISSUE... TO REVIEW AN INVALID SENTENCE WHEN, WITHOUT THE REDETERMINATION OF ANY FACTS, THE JUDGMENT MAY BE CORRECTED TO

1

5

8

9

10

11

28

" ACCORD WITH THE ONLY OTHER POSSIBLE DETERMINATION IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES." THE APPLICABILITY OF A STATUTE IS A QUESTION OF LAW WHEN THE FACTS ARE CONCEEDED. 2 NEAL, SUPRA, 55 CAL. 2D 11.) THIS CASE ALSO INVOLVES THE LEGISLATIVE INTENT 3 OF CALIFORNIA'S PENAL CODE § 654 AND ITS APPLICATION WHICH PROVIDES: IF THE SEV-4 VERAL CHARGES ARE TRIED IN A SINGLE PROCEEDING. THE DEFENDANT MAY BE FOUND GUI-LTY OF ALL THE OFFENSES, BUT UNDER P.C. [§] 654, ONLY ONE PUNISHMENT MAY BE IMP Posed. It further holds: if many offenses were incident to one objective, a def NDANT MAY ONLY BE PUNISHED FOR THE OFFENSE CARRYING THE GREATEST PUNISHMENT. SEE 1 WITKIN. SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW 3D (WEST LAW(2000) CHAPTER III DEFENSES § 168)(SEE ALSO GOODEL, 243 CAL. APP. 4TH 484.) THIS CASE ALSO INVOLVES THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAUSE OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT WHICH PREVENTS THE SENTENCING COURT FROM PRESCRIBING GREATER PUNISHMENT THAN THE LEGISLATURE INT-12 ENDED. (MISSOURI V. HUNTER, 459 U.S. 359). IT INVOLVES P.C. §§ 669 AND 954 ALSO. 13 14 STATEMENT OF THE CASE 15 A JURY FOUND MR. CAIN GUILTY OF KIDNAPING FOR ROBBERY AND ROBBERY, THE COURT 16 STAYED SENTENCE IN COUNTS 6,7,9,10, AND 11 UNDER P.C. § 654, BUT IMPOSED SEPE-17 RATE PUNISHMENT'S IN COUNT'S 5 AND 9. ON HABEAS MR. CAIN CONTENDED THAT REVER-18 SAL IS REQUIRED BECAUSE HIS SENTENCE WAS FUNDAMENTALLY UNFAIR. IN VIOLATION OF 19 DUE PROCESS (LUKE W. CAIN ON HABEAS, CASE NO. RIC2004095) THE RIVERSIDE COURT 20 REJECTED THE CLAIMS. MR. CAIN FILED A NEW HABEAS IN THE COURT OF APPEALS. FOU-21 RTH APPELLATE DISTRICT, DIV. TWO, THIS COURT ALSO DENIED RELIEF. MR. CAIN FILED 22 A TIMELY PETITION FOR REVIEW IN THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT. HE ARGUED: THE 23 STATES MISAPPLICATION OF ITS OWN SENTENCING LAWS AND STATUTORY COMMANDS OF P.C. \$54 WAS FUNDEMENTALLY UNFAIR AND RESULTED IN AN UNAUTHORIZED SENTENCE AND THAT 24 25 THERE WAS SINSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT A FINDING OF SEPERATE INTENSES AND DBJECTIVES IN COUNTS 5 AND 9 IN VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS. THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT DENIED HIS PETITION WITHOUT CITATION TO ANY CASES ON MAY 26,2021. THIS 27~ PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI FOLLOWS:

REASON(S) FOR GRANTING REVIEW

THIS CASE INVOLVES QUESTIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL MAGNITUDE, IT ALSO INVOLVES A VIOLATION OF THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAUSE OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT AND A VIOLATION OF THE FOURTEETH AMENDMENTS DUE PROCESS GUARANTEE AT SENTENCING. BECAUSE THE QUESTION OF WHETHER THE PUNISHMENTS IMPOSE BY THE RIVERSIDE SUPERIOR COURT AFTER CAINES!'S CONVICTION UPON CRIMINAL CHARGES ARE UNCONSTITUTIONALLY MULTIPLE CANNOT BE RESOLVED WITHOUT DETERMINING WHAT PUNISHMENTS THE CALIFORNIA LEGISLATIVE BRANCH AUTHORIZED AS CONSTITUTIONALLY PERMISSIBLE, REVIEW OF THIS CASE IS NECESSARY.

· 26 ·

27⁻

ARGUMENT ONE

WHAT PUNISHMENTS THE LEGISLATIVE BRANCH AUTHORIZED AS CONSTITUTION-ALLY PERMISSIBLE FOR MULTIPLE OFFENSE IS NOT CLEAR ON ITS FACE.

IN ALBERNAZ V. UNITED STATES (1980),450 U.S. 333,344, THE COURTS HELD "THE QUESTION OF WHAT PUNISHMENTS ARE CONSTITUTIONAALY PERMISSIBLE IS NOT DIFFERENT FROM THE QUESTION OF WHAT PUNISHMENTS THE LEGISLATIVE BRANCH INTENDED TO IMPOSE. (SEE WHALEN V. UNITED STATES, (1980),445 U.S. 684,688) HOLDING "THE QUESTION OF WHETHER PUNISHMENTS IMPOSED BY A COURT AFTER A DEFENDANTS CONVICTION UPON CRIMINAL CHARGES ARE UNCONSTITUTIONALLY MULTIPLE CANNOT BE RESOLVED WITHOUT DETERMINING WHAT PUNISHMENTS THE LEGISLATIVE BRANCH AUTHORIZED.

SEVERAL CASE ILLISTRATE THAT WHERE THER IS CLEAR EVIDENCE OF LEGISLATIVE INTENT, MULTIPLE SENTENCES ARE POSSIBLE EVENTHOUGH A BLOCKBURGER ANALYSIS WOULD INDICATE OTHERWISE." (UNITED STATES V. WHITE, 116 F. 3D 903,932.) "EVEN IF ONE CRIME IS A LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE OF ANOTHER, PUNISHMENTS MAY BE IMPOSED FOR BOTH 'IF CONGRESS INTENDED THAT THEY BOTH BE IMPOSED." (QUOTING UNITED STATES V. BAKER, 63 F.3D 1478,1494 (9TH CIR. 1995).) THE SUPREME COURT HAS HELD THAT WHEN A DEFENDANT HAS BEEN TRIED AND CONVICTED IN A STATE COURT OF MUNTIPLE OFFENSES, EACH INVOLVING DISCRETE STATE COURT SENTENCING PRESCRIPTIONS, IT DOES

3

5

7

8

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

NOT OFFEND THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION IF UNDER STATE LAW A STATE JUDGE IS INT-RUSTED WITH DISCRETION TO DECIDE WHETHER THE SENTENCES FOR THE DISTINCT OFFE-NSES SHALL BE SERVED CONSECUTIVELY OF CONCURRENTLY (SEE OREGAN V. ICE, (2009), 555 U.S. 160,166, SEE ALSO COLTON V. HALL, 386 FED. APPX. 606,607-09 (9TH CIR, 2010)(UNDUBLISHED)(STATE MAY ASSIGN TO JUDGES DESCRETION WHETHER TO IMPOSE CONSECUTIVE SENTENCING)(CITING ICE); PEOPLE V. BLACK, 41 CAL. 4TH 799,821,822, UNDER CALIFORNIA LAW, TRIAL COURT HAS DISCRETION TO DECIDE WHETHER TO IMPOSE CONCURRENT OR CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES FOR DISCRETE OFFENSES. (SEE PENAL CODE § 669, REQUIRERING THAT WHEN A PERSON HAS BEEN CONVICTED OF TWO OR MORE OFFENSES THE COURT MAY DECIDE WHETHER THE TERMS ARE TO BE CONCURRENT OR CONSECUTIVELY REGARDLESS OF AGGRAVATING AND/OR MITIGATING FACTORS (i.e., WHETHER TWO DISTINCT CRIMES ARE COMMITTED DURING A SINGLE CRIMINAL EPISODE,) THUS, UNDER THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF § 669, THERE IS NO PROTECTION FROM MULTIPLE PUNISHMENTS. THIS IS A CLEAR INDICATION OF THE LEGISLATIVE INTENT TO AUTHORIZE AS CONSTITUTIONALLY PERMISSIBLE CONCURRENT OR CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES. HOWEVER, ON THE OTHER HAND, CALIFORNIA STATUTORY AND CASE PERMIT CONVICTION DF MULTIPLE OFFENSES BASED ON A SINGLE ACT OR INDIVISIBLE COURSE OF CONDUCT WHILE PROTECTING AGAINST MULTIPLE PUNISHMENTS (§§ 954 AND 654). THUS, UNDER THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THESE STATUTES, MULTIPLE PUNISHMENTS MAY NOT BE IMPOSED

DF MULTIPLE OFFENSES BASED ON A SINGLE ACT OR INDIVISIBLE COURSE OF CONDUCT WHILE PROTECTING AGAINST MULTIPLE PUNISHMENTS: (§§ 954 AND 654). THUS, UNDER THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THESE STATUTES, MULTIPLE PUNISHMENTS MAY NOT BE IMPOSED FOR A SINGLE "ACT OR OMISSION." (§ 654(a).) IN ADDITION, § 654 PROHIBITS MULTIPLE PUNISHMENT FOR MULTIPLE ACTS WHICH COMPRISE AN "INDIVISIBLE COURSE OF CONDUCT." (SEE PEOPLE V. HESTER (2000), 22 CAL. 4TH 290,294). AND FURTHER PROHIBITS MULTIPLE PUNISHMENT FOR SEVERAL CHARGES TRIED IN A SINGLE TRIAL (SEE WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW 3D (WESTLAW (2000)) CHAPTER III DEFENSES § 168). THIS IS A CLEAR INDICATION OF THE LEGISLATURE INTENT NOT TO AUTHORIZE AS CONSTITUTIONALLY PERMISSIBLE CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES WHEN TWO DISTINCT CRIMES ARE COMMITTED DURING A SINGLE CRIMINAL EPISODE COMPRISING AN

INDIVIDUAL COURSE OF CONDUCT, AS SEEN ABOVE, DUE TO DIFFERENT PROVISIONS OF EACH STATUTE AND PENAL CODE, THE LEGISLATIVE INTENT OF WHAT SENTENCE IS AUTHORIZED FOR MUNTIPLE OFFENSES IS NOT CLEAR ON ITS FACE, AND BECAUSE THE LEGISLATIVE INTENT IS NOT CRYSTAL CLEAR, THE ONLY QUESTION AS TO THE MULTIPLE PUNISHMENTS WOULD BE: WHAT PUNISHMENTS ARE CONSTITUTIONALLY PERMISSIBLE?

ARGUMENT TWO

BECAUSE THE SENTENCING COURT IMPOSED GREATER PUNISHMENT THAN THE LEGISLATURE INTENDED, PETITIONER'S SENTENCE MAY NOT BE CONSTITUTIONALLY PERMISSIBLE.

BECAUSE THE SUBSTANTIVE POWER TO PRESCRIBE CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS IS VESTED WITH THE LEGISLATURE, THE QUESTION UNDER THE DOUBLE JEOPLARY CLAUSE OF WHETHER PUNISHMENTS ARE "MULTIPLE IS ESSENTIALLY ONE OF LEGISLATIVE INTENT! (SEE BROWN V. OHIO (1977), 432 U.S. 161; PLACENCIA V. ALAMEIDA, 467 F.3D 1190, L204 (9TH CIRT 2006); OHIO V. JOHNSON, 467 U.S. 493,499.) WITH RESPECT TO CUMULATIVE SENT-ENCES IMPOSE IN A SINGLE TRIAL, "THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAUSE DOES NO MORE THAN PREVENT THE SENTENCING COURT FROM PRESCRIBING GREATER PUNISHMENT THAN THE LEGISLATURE INTENDED." (MISSOURI V. HUNTER 459 U.S. 359,366; JONES V. THOMAS (1989) 429 U.S. 376,381) WHEN THE LEGISLATURE INTENDS TO IMPOSE MULTIPLE PUNISHMENT DOUBLE JEOPARDY IS NOT INVOLKED (PLACENCIA, 467 F.3D AT 1204).

26 -

27-

HERE... A LEGISLATURE SPECIFICALLY AUTHORIZES CUMULATIVE PUNISHMENT... A COURTS TASK OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION IS AT AN END AND THE... TRIAL COURT MAY IMPOSED ULATIVE PUNISHMENT UNDER SUCH STATES IN A SINGLE TRIAL (MISSOURI V. HUNTER, 459 ... 359, 368, 369.) IN CALIFORNIA, THE LEGISLATURE HAS MADE ITS INTENT CRYSTAL CLEAR, IF THE SEVERAL CHARGES ARE TRIED IN A SINGLE PROCEEDING THE DEFENDANT MAY BE FOUND GUILTY OF ALL THE OFFENSES, BUT UNDER PENAL CODE § 654, ONLY ONE PUNISHMENT MAY BE IMPOSE. (SEE 1 WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW 3D (WESTLAW (2000)) CHAPTER III DEFENSES § 168.) SEE ALSO NEAL V. CALIFORNIA, 55 CAL. 2D 11, 18-19 (DISTINCT CRIMES MAY BE CHARGED IN SEPERATE COUNTS IN ONE PRO-

CEEDING AND MAY RESULT IN MULTIPLE GUILTY VERDICTS, BUT SENTENCES MAY BE FOR ONE OFFENSE, i.e., THE ONE CARRYING THE HIGHEST PUNISHMENT, PURSUANT TO PENAL CODE § 654.) PENAL CODE § 654 ALSO PRECLUDES MULTIPLE PUNISHMENTS FOR A SINGLE 3 ACT OR INDIVISIBLE COURSE OF CONDUCT. (PEOPLE V. HESTER, (2000) 22 CAL. 4TH 29D 5 294.) 6 7 BECAUSE ALL CAINES'S COUNTS FOR KIDNAPING FOR PURPOSES OF ROBBERY AND ROBBERY WERE TRIED IN A SINGLE TRIAL AND THE PROSECUTOR AGREED THAT CAINES WHOLE PURP-9 POSE WAS TO ROB THE VICTIMS AND WHEN THE MOVEMENT TO THE BANK BEGAN IT WAS TO FURTHER THAT GOAL, AND THE TRIAL JUDGE ALSO CONCEEDED THAT THE CRIMES AND OBJ-10 11 ECTIVES IN THIS CASE WERE ONE SINGLE INTENT AND OBJECTIVE TO OBTAIN MONEY FROM THE VICTIMS AND WAS A CONTINUOUS COURSE OF CONDUCT, AND BECAUSE IT WAS NOT THE 12 13 LEGISLATURE'S INTENT TO PERMIT MULTIPLE PUNISHMENTS UNDER THE ABOVE CREINSTANCES THE ONLY QUESTION AS TO THE MULTIPLE SENTENCE IMPOSED ON CAINES IS WHETHER THE 14 PETITIONER'S SENTENCE IS CONSTITUTIONALLY PERMISSIBLE? 15 16 CONCLUSION BECAUSE THE LEGISLATIVE INTENT OF WHAT PUNISHMENTS ARE CONSTITUTIONALLY PERMIS-17 18 SIBLE IS NOT CLEAR ON ITS FACE AND BECAUSE THE RECORD ESTABLISHES ONLY A SINGLE TRIAL IN WHICH MULTIPLE GUILTY VERDICTS WERE FOUND BUT SEPERATE PUNISHMENTS WERE 19 20 IMPOSED AND BECAUSE THE SENTENCING COURT SPECIFICALLY FOUND THAT THE CRIMES AND PBJECTIVES IN THIS CASE WERE NOT INDIVIDUAL AND SEPERATE ACTS BUT "ONE SINGLE 21 ACT WITH ONE INTENT AND OBJECTIVE' COMPRISING OF ONE CONTINUOUS COURSE OF CON-22 23 DUCT. CAINES'S SENTENCE MAY REFLECT A CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATION AND REVIEW IS 24 NEGESSARY TO SETTLE IMPORTANT QUESTIONS OF LAW. 25 26 THE PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI SHOULD BE GRANTED. SIGNATURE: 9197021 27. RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED 28 LUKE W. CAIN